Abstract-An important step for developing a safety-critical system is the design of its architecture. The IEC 61508 standard provides a set of architectures (1oo2, 2oo3, ...) on a high level. It is left up to the system architect to refine these architectures and to come up with a set of methods which achieve the safety goals of the system. A pool of these methods is listed in part 7 of the IEC 61508 standard. However, especially for novel safety architects choosing appropriate methods and arguing for system safety through the application of these methods is rather difficult.
I. INTRODUCTION
The IEC 61508 safety standard provides a set of techniques and measures which are approved and can be used to implement safety-critical systems. They are described in the part 7 of the standard and describe approaches how to control random and systematic failures. However, for system architects who are not very familiar with the standard, it is rather complicated to choose appropriate techniques and measures from the huge pool given in the standard.
To overcome this problem, we provide architectural safety patterns in [1] . These patterns can be linked to IEC 61508 techniques and measures (as we present in one of our previous works [2] ) to provide an initial suggestion of which IEC 61508 techniques and measures are appropriate for a given architecture. In this paper we want to evaluate the approach of using architectural safety patterns by comparing the IEC 61508 techniques and measures suggested by the pattern with real safety-critical system architectures which apply them. We present two case studies including the information about the IEC 61508 techniques and measures they apply. Furthermore, we discuss how well the techniques and measures suggested by our safety patterns would have fitted for the two case study architectures. 
II. IEC 61508 SAFETY DESIGN PROCESS
This section presents an introduction of how systems conforming the IEC 61508 standard are developed. Furthermore, related work on that topic is covered.
A. Development According to the IEC 61508 Standard
During the design phase of a safety-critical product, an architect first has to decide which high-level architecture is appropriate for the safety system. Part 6 of the IEC 61508 standard suggests some well-known safety architectures such as the triple modular redundancy system or other architectures with redundant hardware. With the safety pattern system in [1] we refine some of these architectures and we add some new architectures to choose from.
After choosing an appropriate architecture, a safety architect has to select safety-relevant methods to achieve the safety goals of the system. Part 7 of the IEC 61508 standards provides a pool of more than 200 techniques and measures (e.g. monitor outputs, hardware redundancy, ...) and also gives recommendations for some techniques and measures to which Safety Integrity Level (SIL) they are appropriate. The process for choosing suitable techniques and measures for an architecture is described in [3] in a pattern notation. To further guide the selection of techniques and measures for the architect, we provide a link in [2] to relate our safety design patterns witch IEC 61508 techniques and measures. According to [4] this so far missing link between safety methods and safety goals is a major shortcoming of current safety approaches.
B. Related Work
This section presents related work on software development processes which explicitly the IEC 61508 standard.
In [5] , safety-related design patterns are connected to the IEC 61508 standard by giving suggestions for which patterns to use depending on the required SIL. These recommendations are based on the IEC 61508 techniques and measures which are used by the pattern. Compared to this paper, we provide a richer set of IEC 61508 techniques and measures which can be more flexibly connected to the patterns.
IEC 61508 techniques and measures are tailored to be more applicable for model-based design in the automotive domain in [6] . The techniques and measures are extended by additional information about tools and processes for model-based design. This provides a different view on the IEC 61508 techniques and measures for the automotive domain. This view is tailored to be easier understandable for automotive domain experts.
Applying and Evaluating Architectural IEC 61508 Safety Patterns
Christopher Preschern, Nermin Kajtazovic, and Christian Kreiner [7] maps SPICE software development processes to functional safety artifacts defined in the safety standard. The selection and verification of IEC 61508 techniques and measures is integrated in the overall SPICE safety system development process. The application of this approach is shown on several examples from the automotive domain in [8] .
III. ARCHITECTURAL SAFETY PATTERNS
In this section we introduce safety patterns and present one of our patterns from [1] in detail. Furthermore, we show how we want to evaluate the pattern with case studies. The concept of design patterns is well known in software development. Patterns are good solutions for re-occurring problems and they discuss consequences of these solutions.
Design patterns for safety-critical hardware systems are introduced in [9] , [10] . Some additional safety patterns are presented in [11] where also software-implemented safety patterns are handled. In [12] hardware as well as software patterns are collected and presented as a catalog. The catalog focuses on the consequences of the pattern application on quality attributes such as reliability, safety, cost, modifiability, and execution time. In [1] , we reviewed and structured this catalog. Additionally, we linked the patterns to Lecture Notes on Software Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 2014 basic architectural design decisions, called safety tactics. Safety tactics are generic principles which can be applied to architectures in order to increase their safety. Safety tactics can be related to IEC 61508 techniques and measures as shown in [2] , where we linked each safety tactic to a set of IEC 61508 techniques and measures by analyzing the IEC 61508 standard in a structured way.
In this paper we now combine the work of our last two papers (on a safety pattern system [1] and on connecting safety tactics to the IEC 61508 standard [2] ) to obtain and evaluate safety patterns which are linked to IEC 61508 techniques and measures. These patterns can be used to structurally argue about the safety of the overall system architecture which is then linked to techniques and measures actually described by the IEC 61508 safety standard.
A. Homogenous Duplex Pattern
In this section we present one of the patterns from [1] , the Homogenous Duplex Pattern. An excerpt of this pattern is shown the Fig. 1 . We can see from the "GSN Diagram" section of the pattern, that it uses three safety tactics:
In [2] , we linked safety tactics to IEC 61508 methods, which now allows us to connect the IEC 61508 methods to the architectural safety patterns. Table I shows the IEC 61508 techniques and measures which are related to the three tactics used by the Homogenous Duplex Pattern. 
B. Pattern Evaluation
In the following we want to evaluate the link between the Homogenous Duplex Pattern and the IEC 61508 techniques and measures by comparing the techniques and measures linked to the pattern to the techniques and measures actually used in case studies which implement the pattern. In the standard, we have a big pool of techniques and measures and we want to know whether our selection from this pool by the pattern is good. This is a classical information retrieval problem; therefore, to evaluate the pattern, we calculate Precision and Recall values, which are well known information retrieval measures.
In
), which tells us how many percent of the overall techniques and measures from the standard are actually applied. This measure gives us an impression of how much the effort for a safety architect is reduced if he just has to look at our suggested techniques and measures instead of the whole set from the safety standard. 
IV. CASE STUDY I: FREQUENCY CONVERTER
In this section we compare the IEC 61508 techniques and measures used by a frequency converter system to the techniques and measures described by our Homogenous Duplex Pattern. Fig. 2 . Frequency converter architecture presented by Berthing et al. [13] .
A. System Description
The safety-critical system we will discuss is taken from Berthing et al. [13] . The reason for choosing this system is that the paper was the only one we could find which gives detailed information about the applied IEC 61508 techniques 
and measures of an architecture. The system is a safety-related frequency converter which uses the 1oo2D architecture, which is also known as the homogenous duplex architecture. A 1oo2D architecture is a high level architecture which is described in the IEC 61508 standard. It consists of two independent hardware channels producing two outputs which are checked by a comparator. Additionally, a 1oo2D system is equipped with diagnostic tests. If the tests fail or if the outputs differ, the system goes into a fail-safe state. Fig. 2 shows the system architecture for the frequency converter presented by Berthing et al. Table II we can see that most of the methods which are actually used by the frequency converter architecture are already suggested by the HOMOGENOUS DUPLEX PATTERN. With the information from this table, we calculate the following metrics:
B. Evaluation of the Link of IEC 61508 Methods to the Homogenous Duplex Pattern
Both, the Precision and the Recall are reasonably high to provide a good selection of suitable methods for the architecture. The Occurrence value shows that about 90% of the 216 techniques and measures form the IEC 61508 standard are not used by the architecture. This means that especially for inexperienced safety architects, the architectural safety patterns can be very useful during the design phase to provide an initial overview of suitable IEC 61508 for a specific system architecture.
V. CASE STUDY II: AUTOMATION SYSTEM CONTROLLER
In this section we compare the IEC 61508 techniques and measures used by an automation system controller to the techniques and measures described by our HOMOGENOUS DUPLEX PATTERN.
A. System Description
In an industrial case study we want to certify a programmable logic controller (PLC) for functional safety according to the IEC 61508 standard. The PLC system which applies the 1oo2D architecture is shown in Fig. 3 . It uses redundant inputs and outputs and it has two separate hardware processing units which calculate identical tasks. converter case study, even more of the techniques and measures suggested by the pattern are used in the PLC architecture and we obtain the following metrics:  Precision=17/22=77.2%  Recall=17/23=73.9%  Occurrence=23/216=10.6%
B. Evaluation of the Link of IEC 61508 Methods to the Homogenous Duplex Pattern

Condition Monitoring
The Precision and Recall values, which are both very high. This indicates that the techniques and measures suggested by the pattern fit the actually used techniques and measures very well. The Occurrence is almost the same as in the frequency converter case study.
VI. CONCLUSION
We showed the application of an architectural safety pattern from our safety pattern system which is presented in [1] . We evaluated the suitability of the HOMOGENOUS DUPLEX PATTERN by comparing its consequences in terms of suggested IEC 61508 methods to the methods applied in two case studies which use this architecture. From the results we can see that the patterns deliver reasonable results concerning the suggested methods.
Including the safety methods in the patterns brings benefits for system architects, because they can use the well-known pattern notation to get an overview of the IEC 61508 methods. In particular for system architects who are unfamiliar with the standard, this can be very useful. The patterns additionally provide a well-structured approach to argue about system safety by connecting the safety goals of the architecture to the IEC 61508 methods through Goal Structuring Notation.
With this paper we presented how safety pattern can be applied to design safety-critical systems and we showed how patterns can even be used to argue about the safety of a system. By showing the suitability of safety patterns for real safety architecture, we hope that this paper gives an impetus to the usage of design patterns in the safety domain. Lecture Notes on Software Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 2014 
